did a Google Search of some old friends’ names the other day and I found the following in a briefing paper used at Army Forces Command (FORSCOM). Interesting thing is…this is from an email I sent to friends shortly before retiring from the Army. I knew full well it would be passed along but it’s still out there and I know that most of this stuff still applies, so I’m sharing it here:
I made my last flight as an Army Aviator on 16 February 2000. During that flight, which ended a flying career of 4,541.9 mishap-free hours I reflected back on my experiences and also thought about some of the problems being experienced by today’s aviators. Below are some random thoughts on where we came from, the problems, and where I think we’re headed. A lot of this probably sounds like whining, but humor me,…I’ll be gone in August anyway.
1. Senior Warrant Officers:
When I was a junior Warrant Officer, the most powerful influences on my career were the senior Warrant Officers in my unit. Guys like Roger Duprey, Dana Johndro, Ernie Tussey, and Bob Holmes. They were the true leadership within the unit. If one of the WOJGs screwed up, it wasn’t the Commander or Platoon Leader chewing butt — it was the Senior Warrants, but out of sight of the RLOs. A junior aviator is MUCH more likely to accept aviation and professional guidance from a 5000-hour veteran than he is from a guy still on his first pack of razor blades.
What I see today is that many times, instead of being a mentor and example for the junior Warrants, the senior Warrant is a henchman and hitman for the chain of command.
Instead of helping develop aviators, we see senior WOs concerned with career-building and “appearances”. I think a big cause of this has been the introduction of the rank of CW5. In the ‘old days’, our senior guys weren’t worried about their next promotion because they had risen to the pinnacle of their profession and could concentrate on the task at hand-training aviators.
Yes, there were those that were Retired on Active Duty (ROAD). Today’s CW4 is considered by many commissioned officers to be a guy that hasn’t made CW5 yet, and therefore not necessarily credible. And many CW4s are so concerned about that promotion that they are afraid or unwilling to stick their necks out. (If you are wondering; NO, I have not been passed over for CW5).
We have become a group of bureaucrats and empire-builders.
2. Aviation Branch:
Anybody remember when there was no Aviation Branch? The commissioned officers were Infantry, Armor, or Artillery officers and were quite happy and thankful to be doing a tour in a flying assignment. Their goals were to learn more about the aircraft and do a lot of flying, not screwing with the troops. For the most part, they realized that the Warrant Officers were the subject matter experts regarding aviation. Then came Aviation Branch and we started getting 2LTs right out of college/flight school.
Also, at about the same time, it seemed as if Aviation started developing an inferiority
complex. Commanders started talking about how Aviation had to prove that it was “relevant”. This somehow manifested itself in the form of ABDUs and 4-mile runs. Does anybody below the grade of O4 actually believe that the average Infantryman cares what flight suit you’re wearing as long as you answer his call for extraction or fire support?
We need to stop apologizing for being Army Aviators. Maybe then we will attract some of the strong leaders we so desperately need. So far, all I’ve seen Aviation Branch produce is new street signs at Fort Rucker.
3. Platoon-Sized Companies:
This is closely related to Item 2: When Aviation became a branch, we had to produce our own “leaders” and for us the be “relevant” (as well as for our commissioned officers to be competitive with their non-aviator peers), we had to have Captains as Company Commanders. In actuality, all we did was take Companies, redesignate them as Battalions and re-name the Platoon Leaders as Commanders.
I remember going to the briefings where we were told that all additional duties would be at battalion level, letting the companies concentrate on aviation training. Didn’t happen that way, did it?
We now have all the additional duties that were once in a 60-aviator company in a 16-aviator company. Warrant Officers are spending more time with additional duties than on their primary duty of learning how to operate their aircraft in combat. Hey guys—the best key control roster in the world will be of no use when you need to perform an autorotation after a real engine failure. Of course, that’s advice from a guy who’s received his last real OER……
4. Simulation:
We have developed a dangerous infatuation with simulations. I’m talking about flight simulation as well as battle simulation. Flight simulators are great for many things:
a. Practicing emergency tasks,
b. Practicing gunnery tasks (not as a substitute for live fire),
c. Instrument flight training, and
d. Mission rehearsal.
They should not be used as a substitute for flying the aircraft but as an augmentation to the training program. Flight simulators are great training tools, but their usefulness should be kept in perspective. My thoughts concerning battle simulations are pretty much
the same as those regarding flight simulation — battle simulations should augment your field training, not replace it.
Computer sims are marvelous — they can task the leaders, exercise the communications piece (sometimes), etc, but they do not take into account such things as the fact that your crew chiefs are dog-tired because they were on guard duty all night or that it is harder to talk across the battle area than it is across the gym floor.
Battle simulations and staff drills should be used to prepare for real field training to avoid wasting the troops’ time while training the staff and to evaluate your SOPs, but should never be the end-all of tactical training. I was in a battalion in Germany that did not do a single battalion battle drill during the three years I was there. They did take part in several Warfighter exercises, but does anybody want to take a guess regarding how well the unit performed on our Bosnia rotations? I mean the real deal, not what you read in the papers.
5. Advanced Aircraft:
When all we had were simple single-engine aircraft, we were all better aviators. Sure, this statement may be the result of a “Wooden ships and iron men” attitude on my part, but I honestly feel that we took our craft more seriously back then. Today we count on the fire control computer and the navigation systems to do the tasks we used to perform using our knowledge of ballistics and navigation. I would be willing to put almost any mid-80’s Cobra pilot up against almost any of today’s Apache pilots.
There are whole areas of aviation knowledge that are gone forever and Army Aviation is worse off because of it. Another problem with advanced aircraft is that, due to their high cost of operation and maintenance requirements, out pilots just do not get into the air enough to be proficient. That is how you have 500-hour aviators as Company Commanders, 1000-hour aviators as Battalion and Brigade Commanders and fully functional Apaches slamming into the ground on CNN.
6. Management vs Leadership:
My first Company Commander in Aviation was a very senior major with 1,500 flight hours, a Distinguished Flying Cross and 35 Air Medals. We all admired him and knew he was capable of doing whatever he asked us to do. When he had a problem with one of us, we got the chewing-out in person, loud and clear.
He was a leader. What I have seen over the last 10 years is that our leaders have a pitifully small amount of experience and are not prepared to command their battalions. Because of the policy of rotating commissioned officers through various staff jobs, we have officers who are incapable of and unwilling to lead soldiers. They hide behind the office door and run the unit via e-mail. I saw my Company Commander in Bosnia getting his butt chewed by the Battalion Commander for not answering his e-mail until it was pointed out that nobody in the line units had Internet access.
This same “Commander” briefed us that he was going to run his battalion like the CEO of a corporation and that he did not have time to get to know his soldiers. (Here’s a hot tip for you, sir: Lee Iaccoca never had to order his underlings out on a blacked-out Deep Attack)
Folks, the Army is not a corporation: Our job is to train and be prepared to enforce the orders of the proper civilian authorities. In other words — to be prepared to kill our fellow man at the risk of our own lives. And you can’t inspire people to do that through e-mail and PowerPoint.
7. Aircraft Maintenance:
Does anybody really think the Army just recently discovered all the maintenance problems with the AH64? Or that they value the lives of aircrews above inflated reports of unit readiness? It appears that the leadership is satisfied so long as the numbers are right: to Hell with training and safety (until it makes the papers anyway).
8. Aerial Gunnery:
Another program receiving lip service from the brass. When is the last time your unit conducted a gunnery that actually involved some sort of training?
I’m not talking about the minimal training required to meet the Army’s requirements for qualification (another PowerPoint slide), but training that improves aviators’ abilities and confidence in employing the aircraft’s armament systems. An AH64 crew is allotted 100 rockets per year — 88 of those rockets are fired on scored gunnery tables (OER entry).
This means that they only have 12 rockets to train with, but these are used either for system validation (”we’ve been reporting the system as ‘up’, now let’s see if it really is”), or “saved” for use during dog & pony shows.
In the AH1 days, we fired a hell of a lot more rockets and everybody was much more
confident in their ability to actually hit a target. Today, the standard is to place 1/3 of rockets in a 300 x 400 meter box. Research would show that the scoring box has grown with every decrease I rocket allocations. Yet another example of lowering standards to enable reporting meeting standards.
9. Crawl, Walk, Run:
When I hear a leader state that “We need to crawl before we can walk and run,” I usually interpret this as “I’ve been sitting on my tail (in DC, on staff, at Fort Rucker, on embassy duty, etc) and am afraid to do any real training or allow you to train”.
With the Army’s policy of rotating commissioned officers through jobs every 12-18 months, very few units ever get out of the ‘crawl’ stage. This gets frustrating for the Warrant Officers and NCOs ,because the unit starts over from scratch every year.
Solution: Training detachments (NOT at Fort Rucker) that train leaders in the flying skills necessary to lead units.
BE SAFE,
Woody Jones
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“Gwell Angua na Chywilydd - Death rather than Dishonour”